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a b s t r a c t
Income inequality, as well as the impact of tax and benefit reforms on it, has typically been evaluated
with respect to ‘snapshot’ incomes, measured over short periods such as one week or year. But
longitudinal data allows long-run measures of income to be used, which will be of interest to
policymakers interested in persistent, rather than only temporary, poverty. We show that the long-run
distributional impact of a reform is the combination of three effects: a ‘static’ effect, which would be
observed if individuals’ circumstances were consistent throughout their life; an ‘income dynamics’
effect, resulting from individuals moving around the income distribution over time; and a ‘tagging’
effect, resulting from the reform affecting individuals differently according to whether they have a
characteristic predictive of long-run income conditional on current income. We propose a simple
method to decompose these three effects for any inequality, poverty, or distributional statistic. We
use the method to examine the distributional impact of the introduction of ‘Universal Credit’, the most
important reform to the UK benefit system in decades. We show that Universal Credit is less regressive
on a long-run basis than a snapshot one, partly because of income dynamics but also because it reduces
entitlements for (or ‘negatively tags’) those who are more likely to find a period of low income to be
temporary, rather than persistent.
© 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Analysis of the distributional impacts of tax and transfer
policies has traditionally examined the effects on incomes mea-
sured over short periods (a ‘snapshot’), typically a week or year
(e.g. Hoynes and Rothstein, 2019; Figari et al., 2015; Congres-
sional Budget Office, 2019). But researchers are increasingly using
longitudinal data to evaluate distributional impacts on long-run
measures of income (e.g., Huggett and Parra, 2010; Brewer et al.,
2012; Levell et al., 2016; Haan et al., 2017; Bartels and Neumann,
2018; Roantree and Shaw, 2018). Both of these sorts of analy-
ses tell us something important. The snapshot impact is useful
because part of the function of the welfare state is to protect fam-
ilies against short-term hardship or more generally redistribute
towards periods of low income. But the long-run impact provides
an important complement, as consumption smoothing behaviour
can make short-term incomes a poor reflection of true living
standards, and policymakers may care more about persistently
low living standards than temporarily low ones.
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A key finding of this literature is that – even when gov-
ernments base tax liabilities and transfer entitlements only on
current circumstances (e.g. incomes, assets, family composition)
– the distributional consequences of reforms can be significantly
different when analysed on a long-run basis. A very common
result is that the long-run impacts of reforms are substantially
more distributionally neutral than the snapshot impacts (e.g. Lev-
ell et al., 2016; Roantree and Shaw, 2018). This is because people
move around the (snapshot) income distribution over time, at-
tenuating the long-run differences in how people are affected by
a reform.
We show that the long-run distributional impact of a reform
is the combination of three effects. First, a ‘static’ effect: the dis-
tributional impact that would occur if individuals’ circumstances
never changed. Second, an ‘income dynamics’ effect: peoples’
incomes change over time, so (for example), a reform which only
affects the poor in the snapshot will affect some who are richer
on a long-run measure. This is why long-run distributional effects
of reforms are typically attenuated compared to the snapshot.
Third, the snapshot impact of a reform may be correlated with
an individual’s long-run income conditional on their snapshot
income. Borrowing a phrase from the optimal tax literature (Ak-
erlof, 1978), we term this effect ‘tagging’: a reform ‘tags’ those
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with a certain characteristic if it affects them differently to others
with the same income but without the characteristic. Like optimal
tax tagging, here the government makes transfers conditional on
something observable and predictive of something unobservable
(in our case, long-run income; in optimal tax, ability). It is dif-
ferent to optimal tax tagging in that it is not necessary that the
characteristic be immutable. This form of tagging creates an ad-
ditional wedge between the snapshot and long-run distributional
impacts of a reform.
We propose a method to decompose the long-run progressiv-
ity of a reform into these three components. Disentangling these
impacts is useful because (absent behavioural response) tagging is
the only way policymakers can change the long-run distributional
consequences of a policy package for a given snapshot effect. Sim-
ply comparing the snapshot and long-run distributional impacts
of policy options will often obscure that part of the comparison
that policymakers can independently vary (the tagging effect).
To highlight the usefulness of this approach we analyse several
policy reforms, including the transition in the UK to ‘Universal
Credit’ (UC), the most important reform to the UK benefit system
in decades, and one with sizable tagging effects.
2. Method
Standard snapshot distributional analysis uses a cross-
sectional dataset of individuals. Net incomes (hereby ‘incomes’)
are calculated under two tax and benefit systems (pre- and post-
reform). Typically these analyses ignore any possible resulting
behavioural changes, which we also do throughout this paper.
This gives pre- and post-reform income distributions, from which
inequality and poverty statistics can be calculated. In long-run
distributional analysis, the same exercise is conducted using a
panel dataset, with every observation of every individual run
through the same two tax and benefit systems. Under each
system, incomes are averaged across observations for every indi-
vidual to compute their ‘long-run income’. Again various statistics
can be calculated with these long-run distributions. Our approach
for decomposing the impact of a reform on long-run income does
not assume any particular length of panel or income process.
However, clearly average income over several periods is more
interesting to the extent that it captures some long-run measure
of income. This is more plausible the longer the panel and the
better behaved the underlying income process.
Our method for decomposing the impact of a reform on the
long-run distribution is as follows. Suppose we have a balanced
panel, with T periods and N individuals. yi,t is the income for
individual i at time t in the pre-reform system; zi,t the post-
reform. Long-run incomes are defined as the individual’s average
income over the T periods, and are given by yi and zi. The
pre-reform (snapshot) income distribution at t is a vector of N
observations of yi,t , yt = [y1,t , . . . , yN,t ]. zt is the analogous post-
reform distribution, and y and z are the distributions of long-run
incomes.
For any inequality, poverty, or distributional statistic I we de-
note the value of I applied to long-run incomes Il. We decompose
the impact of the reform on Il as follows:
∆Il = ∆Is
static
+ (I (h)− I (y)−∆Is)  
income dynamics
+ (I (z)− I (h))  
tagging
(1)
∆Is is the impact of the reform on I applied to short-run incomes.
We derive this by pooling the snapshot distributions across time
periods, and calculating the static as:
∆Is = I (z1, . . . , zT)− I (y1, . . . , yT)
h is the distribution of income resulting from a counterfac-
tual reform, which has the same snapshot distributional impact
as the actual reform but where an individual’s long-run in-
come and the proportional snapshot impact of the reform on
them are conditionally independent, given their snapshot income,
i.e.,
((
hi,t
yi,t
)
⊥ yi
)
| yi,t ∀ i, t . Calculating this distribution is useful
because it helps us distinguish income dynamics from tagging:
because the effect of this counterfactual reform is conditionally
independent of an individual’s long-run income, by construction
it has no tagging effects.
We construct hi,t incomes as follows. First, we pool observa-
tions across periods and separate them into Q quantiles based on
their pre-reform income, indexed by q. The set of individuals who
at time t are in quantile q is given by γq,t .1 The ratio of pre- and
post-reform snapshot incomes, across all T periods, in snapshot
quantile q is given by:
αq ≡
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈γq,t zi,t∑T
t=1
∑
i∈γq,t yi,t
For each i and t , hi,t is given by:
hi,t = yi,t · αq(i,t)
Note that the α parameter depends on the snapshot quantile (q)
that i is in at t . Thus, the impact of the counterfactual reform
on an individual is only dependent upon their snapshot income,
and, conditional on that, independent of their long-run income.
Hence, the counterfactual reform has no tagging effects. However,
it has the same snapshot distributional impact as the actual
reform, since the α parameters are derived from the snapshot
impact of the actual reform. From the set of individual-period
counterfactual incomes hi,t we derive the counterfactual long-run
distribution, h.
We label the first term in Eq. (1) the ‘static’ effect because
it is the effect that the policy would have on Il if individuals’
circumstances never changed. This is of course equivalent to the
traditional snapshot effect. The second term we call the ‘income
dynamics’ effect because it measures how the snapshot and long-
run effects would differ if there was no tagging, i.e. it is the
consequence of the income processes that people with different
incomes (but not different characteristics) experience. For a given
population, the snapshot effect uniquely determines the income
dynamics effect, with the mapping a function of individuals’
income processes. The final term is the ‘tagging’ effect because
the z and h distributions differ only insofar as the reform treats
people with the same snapshot income – but different long-run
incomes – differently.2
By construction, income dynamics and tagging contributions
sum to zero. In principle the results are sensitive to the number
of quantiles Q used. In practice a large Q will often be sufficient,
since within a narrow quantile the effect of the reform typically
will not differ much between the top and bottom of the quantile.
Testing with different Q can indirectly confirm this.
1 Quantile bounds are defined by pooling all periods, rather than within
period.
2 Because here we use pre-reform incomes to put individuals in q quantiles
when deriving αq , the tagging component should be interpreted as showing
the impact of the reform differently affecting those with the same snapshot
pre-reform income but different long-run pre-reform incomes. For this reason,
it is most natural to examine the effects of the reform on statistics (I) which
rank individuals by pre-reform incomes (such as the effect on average incomes
in a particular pre-reform quintile, the statistic we analyse below). To examine
the effect on statistics which involve re-ranking – such as percentiles of the
distribution – it would be more natural to calculate αq by putting individuals in
q quantiles using a measure of income that is invariant to the tax and benefit
system, such as gross (pre-tax and benefit) income.
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Table 1
Proportional impact (%) on snapshot incomes among those in
bottom snapshot quintile.
Reform Long-run quintile
Bottom Top four All
Inc. support for OOW families 1.6 0.6 1.3
Abolish asset tests 0.8 2.1 1.1
3. Analysis of reforms
We use this method to analyse reforms to the UK tax and
benefit system. We use 2009–10 to 2016–17 data from ‘Under-
standing Society’, the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS),
a panel survey of UK households.3 Our sample is individuals ob-
served as adults in all eight waves.4 We uprate financial variables
in the data such as earnings in line with their respective average
growth rates, (e.g. we uprate earnings from past years in line with
average earnings growth since that year) so that they are in a
common year’s values.5 We simulate tax liabilities and benefit
entitlements using TAXBEN, the IFS microsimulation model, to
calculate household (equivalised) incomes.6 We set Q = 100,
though results are little changed with other large values. The
statistic we examine (∆I) is the proportional impact of the reform
on average (pre-reform) incomes by quintile.
3.1. Increasing out-of-work benefits vs. removal of asset tests
To illustrate the method, we compare two reforms with the
same fiscal impact: increasing out-of-work benefit entitlements
for claimants with children by £25.50 per week7; and ‘abolishing
asset tests’, so benefit entitlement is not affected by financial
assets.8
Both reforms largely benefit those who are low income in the
snapshot. But the snapshot impact among such individuals varies
significantly according to whether the individual is low income
in the long-run too. Table 1 shows the impact of the policies on
the snapshot incomes of those in the bottom snapshot quintile,
split by whether they are temporarily or persistently poor (top
four or bottom long-run quintile respectively). Those who find
their period of low income to be temporary gain much more
in the snapshot from abolishing asset tests, while those who
find their period of low income to be persistent gain more from
the increase in support for workless families. This is driven by
the fact that having assets is, conditional on currently having a
low income, predictive of higher long-run incomes; while being
out-of-work with children is, conditional on currently being low
income, predictive of low long-run incomes.
Fig. 1 shows the long-run distributional consequences of these
reforms. The static contributions of these policies (equivalently,
3 University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research (2018).
4 Further methodological details are as described in Brewer et al. (2019).
5 This is equivalent to modelling the same reform in each period without
fiscal drag — so, for example, tax thresholds remain a constant fraction of
average earnings.
6 For a description of TAXBEN, see Waters (2017).
7 This is achieved by increasing the basic allowances in UC for families with
children by £25.50 per week and reducing the ‘work allowance’ – the amount a
claimant can earn before UC starts to be withdrawn – by an offsetting amount
such that the income of anyone earning over the work allowance is unaffected.
This also benefits those in work but earning under the work allowance: a
relatively small group who by definition are not earning much, and so we just
refer to this reform as affecting ‘out-of-work families’.
8 Under UC, benefits are tapered away for those with assets over £6000, and
removed completely for those with assets over £16,000.
the snapshot effects) are very similar. The income dynamics com-
ponents are also very similar (this follows by definition since, for
a given population, the snapshot effect uniquely determines the
income dynamics effect).
But the total long-run distributional consequences are rather
different. While both reforms are less progressive in the long-run
than in the snapshot (compare the ‘static’ bars with the ‘total’
dots), this is particularly true for abolishing asset tests. This is
a consequence of tagging: increasing support for out-of-work
families slightly ‘positively’ tags – allocates a higher proportion
of aggregate income to – those who are long-run poor, while
abolishing asset tests ‘negatively’ tags the long-run poor. This is
not surprising given the results in Table 1.
The key point is that two reforms with a very similar snapshot
distributional picture can have relatively different long-run pic-
tures, if they differentially tag long-run incomes by conditioning
support on characteristics predictive of them (such as having
significant assets). This approach allows policymakers to adjust
the long-run distributional consequences of a policy package for
a given snapshot distributional effect.
3.2. Universal credit
The UK is in the process of a radical benefit reform, with a
single integrated payment – Universal Credit (UC) – replacing
the six main means-tested working-age benefits, and changing
entitlements for 76% of those entitled (Brewer et al., 2019).
Relative to the system that it replaces, UC’s impact is regres-
sive, both in the snapshot and long-run (as shown below), but by
less in the latter. This is partly due to the attenuating effects of
income dynamics.
However, various features of UC determine not only its snap-
shot impact but also the relationship between its snapshot and
long-run impact. UC on average reduces entitlements for those
with significant assets, self-employment income, or who own
their own home. As Brewer et al. (2019) show, all three groups are
particularly likely to find that a period of low income is temporary
rather than persistent. The effect is that UC reduces incomes more
for the temporarily poor than the persistently poor: among those
in the bottom snapshot quintile, those who are in the bottom
long-run quintile see an average loss of 0.8% of their snapshot
income, while those in the top four long-run quintiles see an
average loss of 2.4%.
That means that UC ‘positively’ tags those who are long-run
poor. This can be seen in Fig. 2, which shows that the tagging ef-
fect redistributes from the second quintile to the poorest. Absent
such an effect, the long-run impact of the policy would reduce
incomes in the bottom quintile by 1.0%, and in the second by 0.4%.
But the tagging effect means that the two quintiles are similarly
affected (0.8% and 0.7%). Decomposing the tagging effect from
the income dynamics and the static effects allows us to see this,
highlighting that UC is significantly less regressive in the long-run
than one would expect given its snapshot impact — thanks to its
policy design, and not only income dynamics.
4. Conclusion
Tax and benefit reforms have impacts on families’ snapshot
and long-run incomes. Both of these effects matter from a policy
standpoint — the effect on the snapshot is informative about how
the system protects against short-term hardship, whereas the
effect on the long-run shows how the reform affects those with
persistently high or low incomes, which may be more informative
about their living standards.
The long-run distributional consequences of tax and benefit
reforms differ from the snapshot impact because of both income
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Fig. 1. Long-run distributional impact of increasing support for out-of-work families with children and removing asset tests.
Fig. 2. Long-run distributional impact of Universal Credit.
dynamics and a ‘tagging’ effect, where the reform differently
affects those with characteristics predictive of their long-run in-
come conditional on their snapshot income. These tagging effects
can be large, and considerably reduce the regressivity of the
long-run distributional consequences of Universal Credit.
Policymakers are often constrained to base tax liabilities and
benefit entitlements on current information. Adopting a ‘tagging’
approach – making transfers conditional on characteristics pre-
dictive of long-run incomes – allows them to nonetheless affect
the long-run distribution independent of the snapshot; and even
if they make no explicit attempt to do so, this form of tagging will
often be a feature of their policies in practice. Decomposing the
long-run impact allows the tagging component to be isolated and
compared across alternative policies.
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